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The current study examines the effect of ownership concentration 
on R&D investment by investigating a large panel data set of Korean 
listed firms. Theoretically, concentrated ownership structure can be 
an alternative to mitigate the agency problem caused by the separ- 
ation of ownership and control in a dispersed ownership structure. 
However, whether ownership concentration positively affects firm 
R&D decisions is not obvious due to the contrasting effects of large 
shareholders: risk averseness and long-term orientation. The present 
study uses several econometric techniques, fixed effects FGLS regres- 
sion, dynamic GMM regression, and subsample regressions, and shows 
that the positive effect of ownership concentration on R&D is con- 
firmed in Korea. A non-linear relation between ownership concentra- 
tion and investment is not significant, and neither are the effects of 
foreign investors and institutional investors. The results of the sub- 
sample regressions indicate that the positive effect of ownership con- 
centration is significant in small firms, R&D intensive firms, and 
non-chaebol firms.
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I. Introduction
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in 
motion comes from new consumer goods, new methods of production or 
transportation, new markets, and new forms of organization that a cap- 
italist enterprise creates (Schumpeter 1942, p. 83).
Since the pioneering work of Schumpeter (1942), technological innov- 
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ation has been emphasized as indispensable to economic growth and 
profitability. Recognizing that technological innovation is based on re- 
search and development (R&D) investment, most governments in the 
world have been attempting to increase public R&D support in various 
forms, from R&D grants to R&D tax credits (OECD 2006). An extensive 
empirical analysis by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001) provides em- 
pirical evidence to support the role of R&D as a driving force of economic 
performance.
Given the importance of R&D in improving economic performance, 
identifying the determinants of a firm's R&D investment is worthwhile. 
Ownership concentration is regarded as one of the most important cor- 
porate governance mechanisms influencing managerial decisions. Hence, 
the present study aims to determine and isolate the effect of ownership 
concentration on R&D investment by investigating a large panel data 
set of South Korea (hereafter Korea). Previous empirical studies, such 
as Lee (2008), already confirm the significant effect of ownership concen- 
tration on firm performance in Korea.
Numerous empirical studies have attempted to determine whether 
ownership structure matters in the R&D investment of firms. However, 
most of them examine the moderating effect of ownership on the sensi- 
tivity of a firm's investment to its cash flow (for example, see Hadlock 
1998; Goergen and Renneboog 2001). Only a few empirical studies dir- 
ectly examine the effect of ownership structure on the R&D decisions of 
firms. Thus, the present study contributes to the literature by providing 
evidence of the direct relation between R&D and equity ownership struc- 
ture.
R&D investment has a number of characteristics that differentiate it 
from other capital and financial inputs. We will look into the three main 
characteristics of R&D projects. First, information asymmetries are more 
severe in R&D investment decisions. An R&D performer usually has a 
lot better information about the nature of the R&D project compared to 
providers of external funds (Aboody and Lev 2000). Second, most R&D 
investment is asset specific because the efforts of R&D employees (e.g., 
scientists and engineers) create intangible assets, that is, the firm's tacit 
knowledge bases, which are embedded in the human capital of R&D 
employees (Santarelli 1991). Third, R&D outcomes are highly uncertain 
because high-tech projects are likely to have a low probability of success 
(Carpenter and Petersen 2002). Keeping these R&D characteristics in 
mind, the current study examines the effect of ownership concentration 
on R&D investment decisions.
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The remainder of the study is structured as follows. The next section 
describes the theoretical and empirical work on ownership concentra- 
tion and R&D decisions, followed by a section discussing the sample 
and empirical methods employed in the study. Then, the next section 
presents the empirical findings. The final section summarizes and con- 




Ownership structure, such as ownership concentration and ownership 
identity, is one of the hotly debated issues in corporate governance re- 
search. Current perspectives on corporate governance are divided into 
two contrasting paradigms: shareholder approach and stakeholder ap- 
proach. Such a division is based on the purpose of the firm and its 
structure of governance arrangements explained by the two approaches. 
The shareholder approach views the firm as an instrument for share- 
holders to increase their own benefits, whereas the stakeholder approach 
regards the firm as a locus in relation to the interests of various stake- 
holders (e.g., lenders, employees, and community). In this paper, we limit 
consideration to the shareholder approach.
According to the shareholder approach, corporations should be con- 
trolled by shareholders to maximize their wealth. Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) consider a situation of team production, in which output is the 
joint product of worker contributions and the outputs attributable to any 
individual are difficult to specify. Free-riding behavior is likely to occur 
in this setting. A solution to the free-rider problem is for one member of 
the team to monitor and direct the other members and to be motivated 
by receiving the residual incomes. Maximizing the value received by the 
residual claimant is the same as maximizing the total value received by 
all the members. Thus, this situation leads to a socially efficient level. 
In this sense, shareholders (residual claimants of the firm) should control 
the firm to maximize firm value.
However, typical shareholders cannot control the firm. Berle and 
Means (1932) point out that in the 1920s, ownership in corporations is 
widely dispersed. Numerous small shareholders own only a small stake 
of a large public company, and they cannot manage business activities 
that are handled by professional managers. It is called the separation of 
ownership and control. The agency theory becomes applicable to such a 
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condition because the separation of ownership and control is a principal- 
agent problem.
The separation of ownership and control reduces shareholders' incen- 
tive and ability to monitor management. Legally, small shareholders own 
corporations, but they do not feel a sense of ownership over the firm 
because if one shareholder's monitoring improves firm performance, all 
shareholders benefit, and each shareholder has the incentive to free- 
ride. Small shareholders tend to invest in various firms to diversify risk, 
which leads to investment for a future dividend stream rather than in 
the future of the firm. Furthermore, small shareholders do not have the 
ability to monitor management effectively because they do not have the 
knowledge and information to run a large company.
Various corporate governance mechanisms have been proposed to solve 
the agency problem. One solution to the agency problem is to set up an 
efficient ownership structure that can affect the incentive of shareholders 
to monitor management. As an efficient ownership structure, a concen- 
trated ownership is often suggested. As the ownership stake of block- 
holders increases, the blockholders may have greater incentives to in- 
crease firm value and to monitor management than do dispersed small 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). In addition, concerted actions 
by large shareholders are easier than those of small shareholders. Thus, 
the degree of ownership concentration is one of important factors that 
affect the firm's investment decisions.
Accordingly, ownership concentration matters for firm investment 
decisions. However, one question remains open: Is the effect of owner- 
ship concentration on R&D investment positive or negative? Given the 
R&D investment characteristics described above, the answer to the ques- 
tion would depend on the large shareholders' risk attitude and time 
horizon. We examine them as follows.
First, typical large shareholders are risk averse and conservative in 
business affairs. In contrast to small shareholders who can diversify 
their personal risk by buying stocks in various firms, large shareholders 
often cannot diversify their risk as their stake in the firm increases. 
Faccio et al. (2011) find that firms controlled by diversified blockholders 
undertake riskier investments than those controlled by non-diversified 
blockholders. Therefore, given that large shareholders are risk averse, 
ownership concentration would have a negative effect on R&D spending.
In addition, enhanced monitoring by concentrated ownership may dis- 
courage inside stakeholders (e.g., managers and employees) from making 
costly firm-specific investments, such as R&D investments. Burkart et 
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al. (1997) claim that dispersed ownership gives rise to benefits of man- 
agerial initiative. Managerial discretion contributes to firm value as man- 
agers favor firm-specific investment.
Second, large shareholders are usually long-term oriented because 
they hold a large fraction of the shares in the firm; thus, their earnings 
are dependent upon the long-term survival of the firm. Moreover, due to 
their ability to access information of the firm, which mitigates the asym- 
metric information problem in R&D projects, large shareholders invest 
more patiently. The longer shareholder time-horizon encourages managers 
to invest for a long term and make firm-specific investments.
There exists a more fundamental reason that large shareholders could 
have an incentive to be actively involved in R&D decisions. Small share- 
holders do not feel a sense of ownership of the firm; hence, their focus 
is not on the firm's long-term performance, but on an immediate increase 
in stock price or dividend. If small shareholders are dissatisfied with 
the firm, they will sell their shares rather than attempt to bring about 
changes in the firm. Hirshman (1970) argues that small shareholders 
are likely to express their opinions through exit rather than voice. On 
the contrary, large shareholders can exert power over corporate affairs, 
and thus they have a sense of ownership of the firm. According to an 
organization theory, high involvement and participation can foster a 
strong sense of ownership to the organization (Denison and Mishra 1995). 
Large shareholders can be real owners in this sense, which enhances 
their commitment to the firm's long-term success. If large shareholders 
recognize the contribution of R&D to the long-term competitiveness of 
the firm, they encourage investment in R&D.
In sum, although the risk averseness of large shareholders might lead 
to a negative effect on corporate R&D investment, the long-term horizon 
could have a positive influence on R&D investment. Ownership concen- 
tration has two contrasting effects on firm R&D decisions. If the effect 
of the risk averseness is dominant, R&D spending is discouraged. In 
contrast, if the effect of the long-term horizon prevails, large shareholders 
support R&D investment. We can also expect a non-linear relation bet- 
ween ownership concentration and R&D investment. For example, owner- 
ship concentration initially has a negative effect on R&D expenditure 
due to risk averseness, but eventually, exerts a positive effect once block- 
holders own a sufficient fraction of the shares of the firm to reinforce 
long-term horizon. This issue needs to be determined by empirical work.
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B. Previous Studies
Although many empirical studies deal with the effect of ownership 
structure on the sensitivities of investment-internal funds, only a few 
empirical studies focus on the direct effect of ownership and R&D in- 
vestment. In addition, a few studies investigate the immediate relation 
between R&D investment and ownership concentration.
Some studies report a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and R&D investment (see Baysinger 
et al. 1991; Hansen and Hill 1991; Francis and Smith 1995; Lee and 
O'Neill 2003). All these studies use US firm data; hence, the evidence of 
the positive effect of ownership concentration on R&D might reflect the 
institutional setting of the U.S. The U.S. is believed to have a better 
investor protection environment; thus, the risk averseness of large share- 
holders there is relatively weak. For example, the median values of the 
quality of the rule of law (RL), accounting disclosure standards (ASR), 
and anti-director rights (ADR) for 39 countries are 8.33, 64, and 3, re- 
spectively; on the other hand, the U.S. has 10, 71, and 5, respectively 
(John et al. 2008). The results indicate that the U.S. has a higher 
standard for investor protection compared to other countries. Therefore, 
the negative effect of large shareholder risk averseness on R&D invest- 
ment is not strong in the U.S., which can yield the evidence of the posi- 
tive effect of ownership concentration on riskier projects. In the U.S., 
ownership concentration is not significantly related to risk taking (John 
et al. 2008), and the presence of large shareholders is likely to increase 
the willingness of firms to take risks (Amihud and Lev 1981).
Accordingly, we need to consider institutional settings in investigating 
the effect of equity ownership on R&D. This idea is not new, as corporate 
governance systems in Continental European countries are widely ac- 
cepted as different in many important ways from those of Anglo-American 
countries, such as the U.S. and the U.K. (La Porta et al. 1999; Boyer 
and Freyssenet 2002; Singh 2002). Through the 1970s and 1980s, cor- 
porate governance research examines individual governance mechanisms 
in individual countries. In the early 1990s, however, the research begins 
to uncover the possible impact of differing institutional environments 
on the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms 
(for a survey, see Denis and McConnell 2003). 
The comparative studies typically distinguish between the Anglo- 
American model and the Continental European model. The former is 
exemplified by the U.S. and the U.K., and includes strong shareholder 
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rights, dispersed ownership, short-term value orientation, arm's length 
creditor financing through equity, and active markets for corporate con- 
trol. The latter is found in France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, and in- 
cludes weak shareholder rights, strong stakeholder rights, concentrated 
ownership, long-term value orientation, long-term debt finance, and weak 
markets for corporate control.
Given these differences between the two systems, the effect of owner- 
ship concentration on R&D investment can be different across countries. 
Lee (2005) finds that the positive relation between ownership concentra- 
tion and R&D spending observed in the U.S. is not found in Japan. 
Munari et al. (2010) also show a difference in the relation between owner- 
ship and R&D between the U.K. and Continental European countries.
In comparing the U.S. and Korea in terms of the quality of investor 
protection, the latter does not have a strong institutional setting of in- 
vestor protection: RL is 5.35, ASR is 62, and ADR is 2. These values 
are below the median (John et al. 2008). Thus, we cannot determine in 
advance which among the positive and negative effects of ownership 
concentration on R&D is dominant in Korea. This issue needs an em- 




The current study employs a large panel data set of 424 Korean manu- 
facturing firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange for the time period 
1999-2008. The data were obtained from the database of Korea Listed 
Companies Association (KLCA). The database includes 691 firms listed 
on the Korea Stock Exchange. Some firms that have an amount of 
missing data on the variables required for the empirical analysis, such 
as those that newly entered or exited the data in the middle of the 
period, are eliminated from the sample. The sample consists of 424 
firms, and the total number of observations is 4,240. This balanced 
panel data set might raise the issue of sample-selection bias that the 
balanced panel is a sample of survivors. However, we could not find a 
theoretical reason to expect a significant effect of the bias on the 
relationship between ownership and investment. Moreover, the data 
used in the study are expected to be acceptable, considering that the 
bias decreases as sample size increases.
The variables employed in the empirical analysis are selected as 
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Note: The table shows the summary statistics and the correlation matrix for 
the variables used in the study. s.d. refers to standard deviation. Figures 
in the correlation matrix are correlation coefficient estimates. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX
follows. R&D intensity (rda), calculated as R&D spending divided by 
total assets, is included as a proxy for R&D investment. As independent 
variables, the ratio of net sales to total assets (nsa), the ratio of cash 
flow to total assets (cfa), and ownership concentration ratio (con) are 
used. The cash flow variable is included as a proxy for financial con- 
straints, which are of particular importance because R&D investment is 
susceptible to asymmetric information (Fazzari et al. 1988; Hall 2002).
The ownership concentration variable is calculated as the shares held 
by controlling shareholder divided by total shares. According to the KLCA 
database, controlling shareholders refer to the shareholders who control 
the firm, and they include shareholders owning substantial equity stake 
in the firm, their family members, and affiliated entities. However, the 
database does not publicize the exact definition of “substantial equity 
stake” and “affiliated entities.” 
Moreover, to control for ownership identity, we include foreign owner- 
ship (frn), calculated as the shares held by foreign investors divided by 
total shares and institutional ownership (ist) calculated as the shares 
held by institutional investors divided by total shares. 
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix for the sample are 
presented in Table 1. The correlation matrix shows a sign causing con- 
cern for collinearity between the variables of ownership and sales. How- 
ever, we examine the value of variance inflation factor, and find that 
collinearity does not appear to cause a severe estimation problem for 
the data.
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B. Empirical Methods
The basic investment model used in the empirical study is:
rdai,t＝nsai,t＋cfai,t＋fi＋dt＋ei,t                   (1)
where i refers to firm, t refers to time period, fi refers to firm fixed 
effects, dt refers to year fixed effects, and ei,t refers to the error term. 
The idea behind this model is that investment depends on the firm's 
recent performance, calculated as the level of sales and the degree of 
financial constraints as proxied by cash flow divided by total assets as 
done in previous research, such as Fazzari et al. (1988). Tobin’s Q is 
often used as a control variable for investment profitability; however, the 
current study does not employ Tobin’s Q because it has been criticized 
for being an unconvincing proxy for investment opportunity (Schiantarelli 
1996). For example, investment profitability is supposed to be measured 
by marginal Q, but average Q is employed in empirical studies because 
the former is not observable and the latter is observable. If average Q is 
a poor proxy for marginal Q, the variable of average Q cannot completely 
control investment profitability. Thus, following previous studies (e.g., 
Fazzari et al. 1988), we use the level of sales instead of Tobin’s Q and 
a dynamic model, which is described below.
We attempt to determine the effect of ownership concentration by 
adding the variable of ownership concentration to the basic investment 
model:
rdai,t＝nsai,t＋cfai,t＋coni,t＋fi＋dt＋ei,t               (2)
If the coefficient estimate of ownership concentration is statistically sig- 
nificant, it indicates the presence of the effect of ownership concentra- 
tion on R&D investment.
We use a quadratic regression and a piecewise regression to determine 
if a non-linear relation between ownership and R&D exists:
rdai,t＝nsai,t＋cfai,t＋coni,t＋con
2
i,t＋fi＋dt＋ei,t             (3)
rdai,t＝nsai,t＋cfai,t＋coni,t＋con_hi,t＋fi＋dt＋ei,t            (4)
where con_hi,t refers to the product of coni,t and a dummy equal to one 
if coni,t is above the median value. Equation 3 represents the quadratic 
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Panel Data Models Selection F test for individual effects 9.1016***
Panel Data Models Selection LM test 60.699***
Panel Data Models Selection Hausman test 96.0802***
Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation
Wooldridge's test for unobserved 
individual effects
2.525***
Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation
Baltagi and Li A-RE joint test 4397.102***
Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation
Bera, Sosa–Escudero and Yoon 
locally robust test
712.7368***
Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation
Baltagi and Li two-sided LM test 1523.673***
Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation
Breusch–Godfrey/Wooldridge test for 
serial correlation in panel models
1989.742***
Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation
Durbin–Watson test for serial 
correlation in panel models
1.0972***
Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation
Wooldridge's test for serial 
correlation in FE panels
38.6393***
Note: The table shows the results of the tests for model specification. Figures 
are test coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 
0.1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively.
TABLE 2
MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS
regression model, and Equation 4 refers to the piecewise regression 
model. In the piecewise regression model, the coefficient estimate below 
the median value is one for coni,t, and for high coni,t above the median, 
the sum of the estimates of coni,t and con_hi,t becomes the coefficient 
estimate.
In this study, we use regressions to investigate the panel data set. 
Generally, three panel data regression models are used in econometric 
studies: pooled model, fixed effects model, and random effects model. 
We expect that a fixed effect model is appropriate for the data set because 
a random effects model is useful when a data set is representative for a 
population. However, the data used in the present study are drawn 
from a single country, and thus not a random sample. This expectation 
is supported by the results of three statistical tests such as F test, LM 
test, and Hausman test. For all tests, the test statistics are significant 
at 0.1%. Thus, the fixed effects model is most appropriate for the data. 
The test results are shown in Table 2.
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There are also concerns with the classical assumptions of OLS re- 
gression, that is, no heteroskedasticity and no serial correlation. The 
problems with these assumptions could be severe, especially for panel 
data. In this study, several statistical tests, which are introduced by 
Croissant and Millo (2008), are conducted to examine the problems. The 
results of the tests are also presented in Table 2. According to the results, 
the regression model of the present study suffers from heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation. Thus, a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
regression is estimated in the empirical analysis instead of OLS regression 
to control the problems of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
We take into account the possible differential effects of various types 
of ownership on R&D investment by including the interaction terms of 
ownership concentration and foreign ownership, and of ownership con- 
centration and institutional ownership:
rdai,t＝nsai,t＋cfai,t＋coni,t＋coni,t*frni,t＋fi＋dt＋ei,t          (5)
rdai,t＝nsai,t＋cfai,t＋coni,t＋coni,t*isti,t＋fi＋dt＋ei,t          (6)
As robust methods, we conduct i) a dynamic panel model by GMM 
regression, and ii) subsample regressions. The dynamic model used in 
the analysis is:
rdai,t＝rdai,t—1＋nsai,t＋cfai,t＋coni,t＋fi＋dt＋ei,t      (7)
The dynamic model is estimated by the GMM method of the kind in- 
troduced by Arellano and Bond (1991). In this model, most effects that 
persist over time can be controlled. We use the lags of t－2 and t－3 as 
GMM instruments because very remote lags might not be informative 
instruments in practice. Sargan test values are examined in all GMM 
regressions to determine whether the regression equation is correctly 
specified and the instrumental variables are valid. Equations 5 and 6 
are also estimated by GMM.
Subsample regressions are used to check if the effect of ownership 
concentration on R&D investment is different among subsample groups. 
We split the sample by firm maturity, size, R&D intensity, and whether 
the firm belongs to chaebol, that is, a Korean form of business group. 
Regarding the first three categories, we divide the sample into two groups 
(above and below the median value): old and young firms, large and 
small firms, and R&D intensive and non-R&D intensive firms. For the 








































   
con_hi,t    -0.0393
(-1.2267)
  
coni,t*frni,t     0.0491
(1.0166)
 
coni,t*isti,t      0.0515
(0.8053)
Note: The table shows the results of the FGLS regression. Figures are regres- 
sion coefficient estimates and t-values are shown in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.1%, 
1%, and 5%, respectively. Year dummies are included in regressions. 
Multiple R-squared values are 0.5126, 0.5125, 0.5126, 0.5126, 0.5127, 
and 0.5127 for the first to the last regressions, respectively.
TABLE 3
FGLS REGRESSION RESULTS
chaebol, we examine the Korea Fair Trade Commission annual reports 
to determine whether or not a firm is a chaebol-affiliated member, and 




The total sample regression results of FGLS are presented in Table 3. 
With regard to the basic investment model, the regression result shows 
the positive effect of net sales level and the negative effect of cash flow 
on R&D investment spending. Traditionally, the two variables of sales 
and cash flow are expected to have a positive effect on investment. How- 
ever, the test result shows the negative effect of cash flow. There is a 
theoretical explanation for the negative effect of cash flow on investment. 
According to Cleary et al. (2007), the firms with low cash flows are 
likely to increase investments as cash flow falls because they expect in- 
creased revenues from the investments. Thus, there are costs and benefits 




















































   
con_hi,t    -0.0455
(-1.4048)
  
coni,t*frni,t     0.0029
(0.0716)
 
coni,t*isti,t      -0.0512
(-0.8869)
Note: The table shows the results of the GMM regression. Figures are regres- 
sion coefficient estimates, and t-values are shown in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.1%, 
1%, and 5%, respectively. Year dummies are included in regressions. 
Sargan test p-values are 0.0753, 0.0701, 0.0637, 0.0586, 0.0739, and 
0.0680 for the first to the last regressions, respectively.
TABLE 4
GMM REGRESSION RESULTS
of investment, and which one is dominant is not theoretically obvious, 
which would be determined by empirical investigation.
The effect of ownership concentration on R&D investment, which is 
the focus of the empirical analysis, is statistically confirmed as positive 
at the 5% significance level. That is, R&D investment is found to in- 
crease as equity ownership is concentrated. The positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and R&D investment, observed in the 
U.S. firms, appears to be valid in Korean firms as well. 
A non-linear relation between ownership and R&D is not confirmed 
as statistically significant from the FGLS regression results. Both the 
quadratic regression and the piecewise regression do not show statis- 
tically significant coefficients of ownership concentration variables. The 
regressions with the interaction terms of ownership concentration and 
ownership identity do not show significant results as well. This finding 
































Note: The table shows the results of the FGLS and GMM regressions. Figures 
are regression coefficient estimates, and t-values are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate signifi- 
cance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively. Year dummies are 
included in regressions. Multiple R-squared values are 0.7184 for Old 




implies that foreign investors and institutional investors do not play sig- 
nificant roles in the explanation of the ownership effects on investments.
The total sample regression results of GMM, summarized in Table 4, 
are consistent with the results of FGLS, except for the effect of cash 
flow. The cash flow variable does not have statistically significant coef- 
ficients in the GMM regression probably because the effect of cash flow 
is absorbed by the lagged value of R&D investment. Theoretically, 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) explain that firms with severe cash 
constraints make essential investments only and cannot decrease the 
investments when cash flow declines. In this case, no relationship bet- 
ween cash flow and investment is observed.
The regression results obtained using the subsamples of old and young 
firms are shown in Table 5. The GMM regression provides evidence that 
































Note: The table shows the results of the FGLS and GMM regressions. 
Figures are regression coefficient estimates and t-values are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate signifi- 
cance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively. Year dummies are 
included in regressions. Multiple R-squared values are 0.7467 for 
Large and 0.4240 for Small. Sargan test p-values are 0.2969 for Large 
and 0.4242 for Small.
TABLE 6
SUBSAMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS—SIZE
the effect of ownership concentration exists only in young firms as ex- 
pected because organizational rigidities and inertia in old firms (Hannan 
and Freeman 1984) make it more difficult for controlling shareholders 
to exert influence on management decisions. In contrast, the FGLS re- 
gression yields the opposite result: the effect of ownership concentration 
is significant only in old firms. The results of the regression obtained 
using the sample split by firm age are mixed and conflicting. Hence, a 
clear interpretation of the moderating effects of firm maturity is not 
possible, and further study may be necessary.
When we divide the sample into large and small groups and perform 
regressions, the significant estimates of ownership concentration are ob- 
tained only in small firms in the FGLS regression, which are presented 
in Table 6. The positive effect of ownership concentration on R&D ap- 
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Note: The table shows the results of the FGLS and GMM regressions. 
Figures are regression coefficient estimates and t-values are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate signifi- 
cance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively. Year dummies are 
included in regressions. Multiple R-squared values are 0.4449 for R&D 
intensive and 0.3372 for non-R&D intensive. Sargan test p-values are 
0.4952 for R&D intensive and 0.5411 for non-R&D intensive.
TABLE 7
SUBSAMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS—R&D INTENSITY
pears to be valid only in small firms, although this result is not observed 
for the GMM regression. This finding indicates that having a sufficient 
proportion of shares in a large firm to exert effective control over man- 
agement is not easy for blockholders; thus, the level of ownership concen- 
tration can hardly be meaningful in a large firm.
As shown by the two subsample regressions above, the effect of the 
lagged R&D spending is significantly negative for old and large firms, 
but is positive for young and small firms. That is, established firms that 
invested a large proportion of their budget in R&D in the previous year 
are likely to decrease their investment in R&D in the current year, maybe 
because high investment in the previous period reduces the need to invest 
in the current period. On the contrary, previous investment encourages 
current investment in firms with growth opportunities, such as young 
































Note: The table shows the results of the FGLS and GMM regressions. 
Figures are regression coefficient estimates and t-values are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate signifi- 
cance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively. Year dummies are in- 
cluded in regressions. Multiple R-squared values are 0.8480 for Chaebol 
and 0.4709 for non-Chaebol. Sargan test p-values are 0.4696 for 




The difference between the subgroups observed in the regression using 
the sample split by size is more clearly found in the regression using 
the subsamples of R&D intensive and non-R&D intensive firms. The re- 
sults using the sample split by R&D intensity are reported in Table 7. 
The regression shows that the positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and R&D investment is statistically significant in R&D 
intensive firms, but the relationship is not found in non-intensive firms. 
This result is confirmed in both FGLS and GMM regressions, which show 
the statistically significant coefficient estimates at 1%. It just makes sense 
that, in non-R&D intensive firms, R&D investment is not an important 
issue in managerial decisions; thus, the effect of ownership structure 
on management is unimportant in R&D decisions. Furthermore, the 
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coefficient estimates of ownership concentration are a lot higher in the 
sample of R&D intensive firms than in the sample of all firms. This 
finding clearly supports that the effect of ownership concentration on 
R&D decisions is significantly strong in R&D intensive firms as expected.
The results of the chaebol—related subsample regressions, which are 
shown in Table 8, are similar to the results of the regressions on the 
subsamples of small and large firms. In the FGLS regression, only 
non-chaebol group seems to have a statistically significant and positive 
effect of ownership concentration on R&D investment; however, in GMM 
regression, both groups do not have significant coefficient estimates of 
ownership concentration. If we focus on the FGLS result only, the owner- 
ship effect on R&D investment is not significant in chaebol groups be- 
cause chaebol groups are largely controlled by their founding families. 
However, the current empirical analysis could not isolate the effect of 
founding families due to data availability problem. Additional data are 
required to analyze the complicated ownership structure of chaebol groups, 




In this study, we review theoretical and empirical literature regarding 
the role of ownership concentration in corporate governance and the re- 
lation between ownership and R&D investment. Theoretically, concen- 
trated ownership structure can be an alternative to mitigate the agency 
problem caused by the separation of ownership and control in dispersed 
ownership structure. However, theoretical prediction of the relation bet- 
ween ownership concentration and R&D investment is still a controver- 
sial issue. Concentrated ownership would clearly improve the monitoring 
of management. Nevertheless, whether ownership concentration positively 
affects R&D decisions is not obvious because of the contrasting effects 
of large shareholders: risk averseness and long-term orientation. This 
issue needs to be examined empirically. A positive relation between owner- 
ship concentration and R&D investment is confirmed in several empirical 
studies, but the studies use US data only. If we take the moderating 
effect of different institutional settings into account, we cannot draw a 
universal conclusion from the previous evidence of the positive effect of 
ownership concentration.
The current study attempts to determine the effect of ownership con- 
centration on R&D investment decisions by investigating a large panel 
   THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION ON R&D DECISIONS 107
data set of Korean listed firms. The study uses several econometric 
techniques― the fixed effects FGLS regression, the dynamic GMM 
regression, and the subsample regressions― to determine the effect of 
ownership concentration on R&D decisions in Korea. The empirical study 
shows that the positive effect of ownership concentration on R&D is 
confirmed in Korea, which is supported by the results of fixed effects 
FGLS regression and dynamic GMM regression. A non-linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and investment is not observed in the 
results of quadratic and piecewise regressions. Similarly, we could not 
find the moderating effects of foreign investors and institutional investors 
in the regressions using the interaction terms. The results of the sub- 
sample regressions indicate that the positive effect of ownership concen- 
tration is significant in small firms, R&D intensive firms, and non-chaebol 
firms.
R&D investment is a significant determinant of long-term performance. 
Thus, understanding the factors that promote R&D investment decisions 
is important in government policy and corporate governance. The Korean 
government has been implementing reforms in corporate ownership struc- 
ture, especially since the financial crisis in 1997. Therefore, the em- 
pirical evidence of the positive effect of ownership concentration on R&D 
investment in Korean firms could shed light on the direction of the reform 
program.
(Received 28 April 2011; Revised 22 June 2011; Accepted 26 June 2011)
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